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BOOK REVIEWS
LAWYERS FOR PEOPLE OF MODERATE MEANS.

By Barlow F. Christensen.

Chicago: American Bar Foundation. 1970. Pp. 313. $7.50.
During 1970, 37 of the top-ranking 38 graduates from a prestigious
law school did not accept New York employment offers; salary offers
of $18,000 to neophytes were met with counterdemands of 20 percent
release time for social law practice. Nepotism notwithstanding, many
sons of senior partners declined to accept employment in their fathers'
firms, preferring service in OEO sponsored programs. Yet, Nader's
Raiders found no difficulty in recruitment with minimal salary offers,
if any.' Several non-profit law firms have been formed to espouse public
causes. Brandeis University has announced plans for the establishment
of a law school devoted exclusively to public law. These seemingly
disconnected facts have clear implications of a radical shift in values, a
sharp departure from the profit-prestige-power syndrome that seemed
adequate for earlier generations. Each has a direct relation to the effort
to provide lawyers for people of moderate means, that amorphous group
of tens of millions of citizens referred to as the "forgotten man" in the
days of the New Deal. Not only are "pervasive changes in society . . .
moving at an almost incredibly rapid pace," but also the "so-called
generation gap-often vast in terms of knowledge or understandingnow seems at some points to be no wider in time than a year or two." 2
Consider, then, the tragedy sufficient to evoke the comment, "unrealistic, inadequate, irresponsible, and unprofessional. It disserves both
the public and the bar."' Such was the response of a member of the
ABA Committee on Availability of Legal Services to the ABA's adoption of a Code of Professional Responsibility permitting a lawyer's
participation in group legal services "only in those instances and to the
extent that controlling constitutional interpretation at the time of the
rendition of the services [so] requires" and, even then, "unless prohibited by such interpretation," only if in conformity with four additional
1.

The beginning salary of all Nader attorneys is $4,500. Harv. L. Rec., Mar. 11,

1971, at 2, col. 1.
2. B. CHRISTENSEN,

LAWYERS

FOR

PEOPLE OF MODERATE

MEANS

292

(1970)

[hereinafter cited as CHRISTENSEN].
3. Nahstoll, Limitations on Group Legal Services Arrangements Under the Code
of Professional Responsibility, DR2-Io3(D) (5): Stale Wine in New Bottles, 48
TEXAS L. REv. 334, 350 (1970).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1971

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 5, No. 3 [1971], Art. 12

684

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5

conditions.4 In view of the exhortations of the newly adopted Canon
8, that "A Lawyer Should Assist in Improving the Legal System" and
Canon 9, that "A Lawyer Should Avoid Even the Appearance of
Impropriety," consider, too, the hypocrisy of such action by the ABA
House of Delegates after it had been simply informed by the Chairman
of the Committee on Evaluation of Ethical Standards that "the lawyers
of America are not now prepared to have group legal services extended." 5
With no public debate, the ABA thus decided it would not waste its
funds through emulation of the decade of lobbying by the American
Medical Association to resist all efforts to make medical services available to the entire population. Instead, by declaring such activity unethical
and espousing adoption of the Code by state courts, 6 the ABA has
foreclosed discussion by reliance on the fiat of rule of court with statutory
effect. 7 Although Barlow F. Christensen's scholarly analysis, Lawyers
for People of Moderate Means, was not completed when the Code was
adopted, it is painfully evident that it would have had no appreciable
effect. 8 There has been no groundswell to amend the Code nor has its
adoption by most states raised more than a few ripples of dissent. By
seeking to turn the clock backward, the ABA has only accentuated the
4. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 2, Disciplinary Rule
2-103 (D) (5). The four considerations are:
(a) The primary purposes of such organization do not include the
rendition of legal services.

(b) The recommending, furnishing, or paying for legal services to its
members is incidental and reasonably related to the primary purpose of such
organization.
(c)
Such organization does not derive a financial benefit from the
rendition of legal services by the lawyer.
(d) The member or beneficiary for whom the legal services are rendered,
and not such organization, is recognized as the client of the lawyer in that

matter.
Id.
5. See Nahstoll, supra note 3, at 348 n.35.
6. Presently 26 states have adopted the Code of Professional Responsibility
including New Hampshire, Maine, Virginia, Florida, Ohio, West Virginia, Kentucky,
Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Missouri, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska,
Kansas, Louisiana, Arkansas, Oklahoma, Colorado, Arizona, Hawaii, New York,
Pennsylvania, Maryland, Tennessee and Vermont. In addition 9 other states have
approved the Code and are considering adoption. These states are Connecticut, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, Georgia, Michigan, Indiana, Alaska, Utah, Nevada, Oregon,
Iowa and the District of Columbia. Letter from Fred Beck, Staff Director, American
Bar Association Committee on Professional Standards to the Valparaiso University Law
Review, Mar. 8, 1971, on file in Valparaiso University Law Library.
7. Court decisions have determined that matters of ethics are exclusively within
the jurisdiction of courts and cannot be changed by the legislature. See In re Unification of the New Hampshire Bar, 109 N.H. 262, 248 A.2d 711 (1968) ; In re Integration
of the Bar, 249 Wis. 523, 25 N.W.2d 500 (1946).
8. Portions of the book had been made available as interim statements prior to
publication.
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polarization disclosed by the new life pattern of young attorneys.
This raises several questions concerning Mr. Christensen's painstaking, dispassionate and clinical analysis of every facet of the socioeconomic, historic and ethical factors involved in the effort to extend
quality legal services in civil matters at reasonable cost to those who do
not qualify as indigent, yet fall far short of the property and commercial
interests that have every benefit at their command. Narrowly viewed,
perhaps the ABA could salve its conscience by funding such a research
project by a Senior Research Attorney of the American Bar Foundation,
content that the House of Delegates in its republican form of government would neither examine it nor be swayed by the facts. Charitably,
such a work would supply the scholar and the young attorney with solid
foundation for their proven espousal of such projects. Ironically, it will
provide the United States Supreme Court with a prestigious chronicle
to fortify its further protection of such programs on constitutional
grounds,' in spite of the clear aspiration of the ABA Code that such
fundamental guarantees be eroded, if not reversed, by a later court with
strict constructionist views. For it is quite obvious that because of selfpreference such programs will not receive the popular acclaim of bar
associations, and only through the Court, that least democratic institution
of government, will group legal services be tolerated and nurtured.
Conscious of the hot flames of controversy surrounding any discussion of his subject, the author should be pardoned for what may
appear to many as an unduly methodical development of his thesis.
Those critical of his defensive posture should note that for the most
part solid facts are completely unavailable; almost every one of the
author's careful developments of theorems is essentially empirical with
prime emphasis on history, general experience and deduction. Conceding such limitations, the author has nevertheless assembled a remarkable body of authority for his microscopic analysis of every pertinent factor in the methodology of legal practice. Although such material
is constantly focused on the relation of such factors to the service of the
public, not surprisingly it also provides an ideal standard against which
each experienced attorney may measure his life's work, an understanding of the goals toward which each neophyte may aspire, and sunlight
for the guidance of grievance committees."0
9. See United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967)
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1
(1964) ; NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (based on first amendment protection
for freedom of speech and litigational association).
10. Justice Brandeis observed: "Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for
social and industrial disease. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants." L.
BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS SPEND IT 92 (1933).
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The greatest omission of the American legal profession in the
twentieth century has been the failure to make counsel available to
middle-income groups. Acknowledgement of this shortcoming by the
bar had just begun to take place in the 1960's. As the author lucidly
predicts, corrective action will require the debunking of myths and
cliches fashioned over a century of organization and growth of the bar
in its present form and, therefore, will be quite difficult. But initial
steps toward reform have been taken.
Mr. Christensen's book can serve as a useful primer on the subject.
Underlying issues involved in the problem of legal service availability
are cited and analyzed. The sources of the author's information are law
reviews, cases and other literature of, by and for the bar. No field research
or statistical studies are provided. Nevertheless, the author makes a real
contribution to the subject through the exposition of an unusual perspective.
That perspective is an economic one. The lawyer's service is
analyzed in terms of objectives, functional characteristics, demand,
marketing, costs and production. Such an approach renders several
valuable insights. For example, reasoning from the legal aid-OEO
legal service experience, the author suggests that the steps which may
be taken to increase availability of legal services to the middle class
will in turn fuel that demand and make it even greater.
Thinking the unthinkable is another valuable contribution. The
notions of lower quality services and open solicitations as a means
to lower price and increase accessibility are dispassionately explored.
In the same vein, notions of noncompetition in law practice and omnicompetence of the lawyer are (correctly) labeled as myths and the
ethical rules which depend on these myths for support are analyzed.
Proposals for increasing the availability of legal service include
more efficient law practices, larger practice units, specialization, use of
paraprofessionals, recovery of lawyers' fees by successful litigants, legal
service insurance, subsidies, better lawyer referral services, relaxation of
restrictions on business-getting activities, special law offices for clients
of moderate means and "group legal services." Each offends traditional
values to some degree, but none is so controversial as the "group legal
services" proposal. Stated simply, group legal services (also known under
the appellation, "intermediary arrangements") involves a third party
recommending or funishing a lawyer to a client or paying the lawyer
in behalf of the client. The bar finds dangers of conflict of interest,
solicitation, assembly line methods and price cutting inherent in such
arrangements and consistently attacks such arrangements even before
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the supposed dangers materialize. Militant bar opposition produced injunctions against automobile clubs and professional, labor and business
organizations in the 1930's. The power and prestige of liability and title
insurers enabled these group legal services to survive the onslaught.
But the seeds of regeneration of group legal services were also
planted in the 1930's. Decisions of courts and bar association ethics
committees upheld various legal aid and other "'pro bono publico"
arrangements, including the activities of the Liberty League, a group
offering free legal services to "victims" of the New Deal. These precedents provided the underpinning for NAACP v. Button" in which the
United States Supreme Court struck down Virginia's anti-solicitation
laws as applied to the civil rights litigating activities of the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People. A year later, the
constitutionally protected scope of group legal services was expanded in
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State
Bar 2 wherein the Court afforded similar protection to an arrangement
in which a union negotiated a discount in contingent fee arrangements
and recommended lawyers to union members for prosecution of their
claims under the Federal Employees Liability Act."' Those who had
read Button and Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen as protections for
the assertion of federal rights were disabused of such a narrow reading
by United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Association,4 protecting
an arrangement in which a union's salaried attorney-employees represented union members in prosecution of their personal injury claims
under state law.
This trilogy of cases substantially overlapped in time the five-year
effort of the American Bar Association to modernize the century old
Canons of Ethics into a Code of Professional Responsibility. In January
1969, the ABA's Special Committee on Evaluation of Ethical Standards
published a preliminary draft of the Code which included provisions
legitimizing the group legal service activities of: 1) legal aid or public
defender offices, 2) military legal service offices, 3) lawyer referral
services, 4) bar associations and 5) professional associations, trade
associations or other non-profit organizations. 5 This was too much reform for the American Bar Association. The final draft of the Code, which
was adopted by the ABA House of Delegates in August 1969, le11.

371 U.S. 415 (1963).

12. 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
13. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51 et seq. (1964).
14. 389 U.S. 217 (1967).
15. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBnTY Canon 2, Disciplinary Rule 2-102
(Prelini. Draft, Jan. 15, 1969).
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1971
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gitimized the group legal service activities of: 1) legal aid or public
defender offices, 2) military legal service offices, 3) lawyer referral
services, 4) bar associations and "any other non-profit organization...
but only in those instances and to the extent that controlling constitutional
interpretation . . . requires the allowance of such legal service activi-

ties."' " The final draft approach has been characterized as, at worst,
patently unconstitutional" and, at best, "a bare bones approach that
would shame a carrion.""
It appears that the ABA's regression will be only a temporary setback to the cause of group legal services. California,' 9 Oregon"0 and the
District of Columbia"' are adopting standards corresponding more
nearly to those of the preliminary draft than of the ABA final draft.
Wisconsin has been the scene of a Judicare experiment. The ABA
Special Committee on Availability of Legal Services has undertaken to
sponsor experiments in legal cost insurance.2"
As with any professional vivisection, much of this book may be
difficult to assimilate; yet, the author is quite capable of inspired communication when the occasion warrants. Consider: "[t]his is not to
say, necessarily, that proscriptive laws [stifling outside competition]
are wrong, but only that such laws can preserve neither the profession's
monopoly nor its status unless lawyers are in fact meeting public demands
and expectations ;''28 and "[t]he ideal of the American legal system
being equal justice under law . . . the fact is that as the litigative system
now functions, equal justice can be had only if both sides . . . are fully
represented by competent counsel. . . .If all litigants are to be equal ...

then no litigants can be 'more equal' than others. ' 24 As for the bugaboo of barratry: "[W]hile the stirring up of frivolous or fraudulent
claims is undoubtedly evil, the stirring up of legitimate claims which
would otherwise go unasserted because of the prospective claimants'
poverty, weakness, ignorance, or naivet may in fact be a positive
16. ABA
2-103 (D).

CODE OF

PROFESSIONAL

RESPONSIBILITY,

Canon 2, Disciplinary Rule

17. Latto, Legal Ethics and Grievance Committee Recommends Adoption with
Amendments, D.C.B.J., Jan.-Mar., 1970, at 61-63.
18. Brown, ABA Code of Professional Responsbility: In Defense of Mediocrity,

5 VAT. U.L. REv. 93, 106 (1970).
19. See Nahstoll, supra note 3, at 349.
20. Id.
21. Latto, supra note 17, at 61-63.
22. CHRUSTENSEN 65-71.
23.

Id. at 28.

24. Id. at 78-79.
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good."25 Concerning the exploding effort of those seeking to obtain
change within the system: "collective effort to achieve common goals is
increasing in all fields of social, political, and economic endeavor, and
it is a virtual certainty that such activity in the field of legal services
will also continue to grow."28 As for the "exclusive license to provide
legal services to the public" and "the tradition of self-regulation based
upon ethical principles :"" the public cannot be deprived "of any meaningful part in determining what is in its own interest

[i]n presuming the infallibility and
restrictions and in ignoring expressed
those who would restrict enterprise
name of the public good have the
heavy one. .

.

;"2

immutability of existing
desires of the public ...
by legal controls in the
burden of proof, and a

. The public is not obliged to prove its need;

the legal profession is obliged to justify the restrictions.29
And regarding "intermediary arrangements" where the primary tests of
potential conflict of interest and of genuine threat to the lawyer's professional independence may be somewhat in doubt: "other public-interest
considerations-such as the importance of the individual rights being
asserted or the practical unavailability of other sources of legal assistance
-may nevertheless demand that it be permitted to exist."3 ° Even with the
fortification offered by the author's analysis, these are powerful, nononsense words.
For those who need tangible illustrations, reference is made to the
recent effort of franchisees to obtain relief from widely claimed abuses"'
in class suits under the antitrust laws. Such litigation costs can easily
range from a modest $100,000 to one million or more. 2 Efforts of
franchisees to raise litigation funds among other members of the litigating class have been met with the counterclaim that such activity was
25. Id. at 145.
26. Id. at 253.

27. Id.
28. Id. at 254.
29. Id. at 255-56.
30. Id. at 278.
31. H. BROWN, FRANCHISING: TR~s" FOR THE TRUSTING (1969),
reviewed,
Swygert, 4 VAL. U.L. REv. 224 (1969); Brown, A Bill of Rights for Auto Dealers,
B.C. IND. & Com. L. REv. 757 (1971) ; Brown, Franchising: A Fiduciary Relationship,
49 TEXAS L. REV. 650 (1971).
32. See Spanos v. Skouras Theatres Corp., 364 F.2d 161 (2d Cir.), rev'd on
rehearing en banc, 364 F.2d 161 (2d Cir. 1966), aff'g 235 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1964),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 987 (1966) (over $80,000 was awarded to plaintiff's legal consultant for services prior to institution of an antitrust suit).
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itself a combination in restraint of trade33 and of improper solicitation
sufficient to warrant the disallowance of class status, dismissal on the
merits and referral of the attorney's conduct to the grievance committee
of the state bar association. "4 In order to prevent such practical limitations from making the pursuit of antitrust relief illusory, this writer
has recommended to the Judicial Conference that the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and of Multidistrict Litigation be amended to permit
early notice of suit to each member of the class, including proposals for
joint effort to share the costs of litigation, subject to court supervision. "
Finally, since this volume raises serious doubts concerning the
ethical propriety of well over a dozen major provisions of the ABA Code
of ProfessionalResponsibility, it is appropriate to ask why the leaders of
the bar were unwilling to await the publication of such an important
treatise which they must have known was almost ready for issuance. It
is certainly relevant to suggest that such newly discovered evidence not
only justifies immediate reconsideration of the entire Code by the ABA,
but also requires notice to every court which has rubber stamped it or
now has it under consideration.36 The author is to be congratulated for
entering where so few have dared to tread. For while there is a growing
belief that the self-policing practices of the ABA are as harmless, though
pernicious, as that of little boys tearing off the wings of flies, " the
direct and repercussive effect of ABA pontifications are still a force with
which to be reckoned. Fortunately, there are not only genuine ethical
considerations but also legal principles whose power is superior to the
33.

Merit Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., Civil No. 2000-70 (D.D.C., filed Mar.

3, 1970).
34. Halverson v. Convenience Food Mart, Inc., Civil No. 70C-499 (N.D. Ill., filed
Mar. 3, 1970).
35. In addition to the fiist amendment protection for freedom of litigational association, note 9 supra and accompanying text, private enforcement of the antitrust
laws has long been recognized as an essential adjunct to the government's obligations.
See Bruce's Juices, Inc., v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 751-52 (1947). This
practice is facilitated by obtaining competent counsel regardless of local restrictions
against the practice of law by out-of-state attorneys. See Spanos v. Skouras Theatres
Corp., 364 F.2d 161 (2d Cir.), rev'd on rehearing en banc, 364 F.2d 161 (2d Cir. 1966).
36. Aside from serious ethical and legal objections to the proposed Code, in this
writer's brief before the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court no less than eight of
the Code's provisions are being challenged under the Declaration of Rights of the
Massachusetts Constitution and under the due process, equal protection and free speech
clauses of the United States Constitution. In Shuchman, Ethics and Legal Ethics:
The Propriety of the Canons as a Group Moral Code, 37 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 244
(1968), the author cogently argues that the canons are primarily directed at "the solo
practitioners and the small firms, to those called the 'little lawyers.'" Id. at 245.
37. Until adopted in local jurisdictions, the ABA Code is technically binding only
on ABA members, though grievance committees and courts have long regarded ABA
opinions as persuasive.
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self-interest implicit in the statement that "the lawyers of America are
not now prepared to have group legal services extended.""8 Compared
with the public interest to be served, it is impertinent to ask what the
lawyers of America are willing to accept.
HAROLD BROWN AND JERRY COHEN*

38. Nahstoll, supra note 3, at 348 n.35.
* Members of the Massachusetts Bar.
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